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Introduction 
There is a large literature on the impact of property rights on efficient resource use and 
the development of markets.  One of the most dramatic examples of property rights reforms to 
enhance efficiency are the land reform processes which have been implemented ‘from Prague 
to Beijing’ and which have radically changed the rural areas of the transition world – and the 
livelihoods of hundreds of millions of poor households (Deininger, 2003; Rozelle and 
Swinnen, 2004). However, the effect of these land rights reforms has been mixed (Lerman et 
al., 2004).  The negative experiences in some countries, such as Russia in the 1990s, have 
caused a debate with some arguing that the reforms went too fast, while others argued that 
they did not go fast enough and that the lack of clear and well defined property rights is a key 
impediment to growth and recovery. 
While perfect property rights are ultimately desirable, moving towards better but still 
imperfect property rights may yield important gains in efficiency of resource use and market 
development (see eg McMillan, 2002).  In the case of China, where land rights reforms 
induced enormous gains in efficiency and reductions in poverty, it is argued that dramatic 
effects have resulted from more efficient, but still imperfect, property rights of land (Li et al., 
1998). Similarly, studies on land use and investment incentives in Africa, Asia and Europe 
indicate that secure land use rights may be sufficient conditions for efficient land use and 
investments by farmers (Brasselle et al., 2002; Feder and Feeny, 1991; Swinnen, 2002).   
In this paper we use data from a recent survey on land use and allocation in Bulgaria to 
analyse the development of land markets and how imperfections in land rights affect both the 
allocation and exchange of land.  The development of land markets is not only important from 
an efficiency point of view, but also for equity reasons (Deininger and Feder, 2002; Swinnen, 
2001).   
Land sales have generally been disappointing in transition countries. This is also the 
case in Bulgaria where very little land was sold in the first decade of transition. In contrast, 
land rental markets have developed fast and extensively. In an environment with large 
uncertainties and high transaction costs, where credit markets and insurance markets are 
imperfect, land rental markets can play an important role in improving efficiency and possibly 
equity in land use and access (Deininger and Jin, 2003; Sadoulet et al., 2001; Vranken and 
Swinnen, 2003). 
However, relatively little is known about the behaviour of rental markets in these 
economies either theoretically or empirically.  There is an extensive literature on land rights 
and how transaction costs affect land use and property rights and farm organizations more 
generally (Allen and Lueck, 1998; Barzel, 1997; Coase, 1960; Demsetz, 1976; Hyami and 
Otsuka, 1993; Schmitt, 1991). However in order to understand the functioning of land markets in transition it is essential to integrate transition specific features. Elsewhere we have 
developed a theoretical model of land markets in transition (Vranken and Swinnen, 2003). In 
this paper we use empirical evidence to get a better understanding of the development and 
functioning of land rental and sales markets in transition by studying the development of land 
markets in Bulgaria, using a unique survey dataset.  
The paper is organized as follows.  The next sections discuss the data, the land reform 
processes in Bulgaria, and the changes in land use and exchange during transition. Then we 
identify several problems with the land market, and we assess quantitatively which factors are 
affecting land use and the development of the land markets.  The final section concludes. 
 
Data 
Our analysis is based on survey data collected in 2003 in three Bulgarian regions
1. The 
North-East region embraces the administrative divisions Dobrich and Varna, the North-
Central region holds Veliko Tarnovo and the South-Central region holds Plovdiv, Stara 
Zagora and Sliven. 
The data include general plot level information on land ownership and exchange and 
household level information on general characteristics, capital endowment, experienced 
problems in accessing land. Our data set holds information about 3,849 plots and 642 
households.  
The survey was designed specifically to study the rental market, using an indirect 
survey approach following Macours et al. (2001).  This indirect survey approach is designed 
to obtain data on both partners in rental activities.  The idea behind the indirect approach is 
that a lot of private information is public at the level of the community.  Selected informants 
can be used to answer questions about individual community members on matters that are 
locally public. To avoid potential problems of selection and information bias, we 
complemented the indirect survey work with targeted survey interviews with the households 
themselves.   
 
A brief history of land reform, use, and ownership in Bulgaria 
The collectivisation of Bulgarian agriculture started in the late 1940s.  Initially, three 
types of farm structures were created: collective farms, state farms and machinery and tractor 
stations.  In the early 1970s these were unified into a small number of Agro-Industrial 
Complexes (AICs).  Within the AICs there were four main forms, Labour agricultural co-
operatives (TKZSs), State agricultural farms (SAFs), Machine and tractor stations (MTS) and 
brigades (Davidova et al., 1997).  Two thirds of the AICs land was farmed in TKZSs and 
SAFs.  Brigades were sub-units within AICs with their own balance sheets, who specialised 
on a single crop or livestock production.  Machine and tractor services had no land and 
provided mechanisation services to TKZSs and SAFs. The second group of pre-reform farm 
structures were private household plots. Table 2.1 illustrates the importance of the farm 
structures. A third group, ‘other organisations’, includes farms attached to research stations, 
schools and forest enterprises, and also auxiliary farms which were part of industrial 
enterprises and the armed forces.  
                                                 
1 The regions were selected to reflect important variations in the rural economy, agricultural structure, property 
rights (if important), geographical conditions, etc. All this changed dramatically after 1989. First, former communist co-operatives 
(TKZS) were liquidated in the early 1990s and their assets were transferred to a variety of 
new farm organisations, including limited liability companies, share holding company, joint 
stock companies and new agricultural cooperatives .  
Second, a land reform restituted effective land property rights to former landowners.  In 
the first transition years, farm restructuring and land reform were subject to intense political 
debate, which had a strong impact on the reforms (Swinnen, 1997).  As a result of political 
changes in the government, the Law for Agricultural Land Ownership and Land Use 
(LALOU) has changed more than 20 times since its adoption. Continuous changes in 
legislation created an uncertain environment. 
Land restitution lasted on average 4-5 years, although the speed of the restitution 
process differed throughout the country. Land restitution was slowed by poor evidence on 
former land ownership. In many villages, former registers with land ownership information of 
the pre- collectivisation period were missing (burned, disappeared, etc.). This forced the Land 
Commissions (LCs) responsible for land restitution to accept all kind of evidence that might 
prove land ownership prior to 1948. As a result, LCs' decisions were contested and land 
reallocation plans were rejected.  Court appeals arose and suspended the market reallocation 
of land. In a few cases, the LC used air photos to prove the pre-collectivisation boundaries. 
There were many land conflicts in the villages during the land restitution process also 
because of people’s attachment to pre-collectivisation land plots and because of alleged power 
abuse by LC members.  First, land was generally not restituted in historical boundaries but 
often in comparable boundaries, meaning the physical location is not necessarily in exactly 
the same location as the pre-collectivisation ownership. This caused many conflicts between 
landowners among each other and between land owners and the LC.   
Second, land conflicts emerged because members of the LCs received consolidated 
parcels of land which were easily accessible from the main road or located in the most fertile 
areas of the territory belonging to the settlement (TBS), while people without decision power 
received fragmented parcels with inferior location or quality. This holds for almost all areas 
that were surveyed during the project and has been a serious source of conflict during the 
restitution process and even after its official ending. 
At the end of the 1990s, more than 80% of agricultural land titles were restituted to 
individuals. The land restitution process resulted in a strong fragmentation of land ownership. 
On average, land owning households own 3.9 ha of land which are divided into 6 plots with 
each an average size of 0.6 hectares.  
There is regional variation in land fragmentation (figure 2.1 and table 2.4). In the North-
East region, land owning households own on average 2.4 plots with an average size of 1.9 ha. 
In the South- and North-Central region a household owns on average respectively 7.5 and 6.7 
plots. The average plot size in both regions is 0.5ha. 
 
The post-transition land market in Bulgaria 
The existence of such a highly fragmented ownership situation increases the need for an 
efficient exchange of land between owners and users of land. Land is used by four types of 
farms: co-operatives, state farms, farming companies and individual farms. The share of 
arable land used by cooperatives and their average size declined since the start of transition. 
In 2001, their share had fallen to 51% of the agricultural land. Individual farmers and farming companies grew in importance. In 2001, both individual farmes and companies cultivated 
approximately one quarter of agricultural land. 
The land sales market in rural Bulgaria is not well developed. Selling of agricultural 
land is very limited. Our survey data show that by 2003 only 3% of rural households own land 
that they have bought since the start of transition. The reason for this is a combination of 
factors. In general land sales markets tend to work imperfectly due to imperfections in other 
markets such as the credit market (Binswanger et al., 1995; Sadoulet et al., 2001; Platteau, 
2000). In transition countries land sales are further restricted, or absent, due to large 
uncertainties, missing legislation or the unwillingness of many owners to part with their 
newly acquired land. Vranken and Swinnen (2003) using survey data from Hungary find that 
liquidity constraints in the presence of important credit market imperfections restricts buying 
as a strategy to enlarge farms, and that labour market constraints induce inefficient producers 
to hold on to their land. These constraints are likely to be even more important in Bulgaria 
given the slower progress of economic and institutional reforms, compared to Hungary.   
The main form of land exchange in Bulgaria is through the rental market. 78% of all 
land owning households in our survey rent land out and 35% of the land cultivating 
households are renting in land.  Around 40% of the parcels which are owned by the surveyed 
households are rented out to a cooperative and 16% is rented out to a farming company (table 
2.3)
2.  This means that more than half of the parcels owned by rural households are rented out 
to a farm enterprise. Exchanging land among households occurs less frequently.  Only two 
percent of the parcels owned by rural households are exchanged with other households.  18% 
of the parcels are cultivated by the owner.  
Land abandonment is widespread. More than 40% of all land owning households in our 
2003 survey leave land abandoned, and 23% of the total number of plots owned by rural 
households are left abandoned. However, there is wide regional variation on this: 67% of all 
land owning households leave land abandoned in the North-Central region, 57% in South-
Central and only 3% in the North-East region.  
 
Co-ownership and property rights 
Besides land fragmentation and abandonment, the Bulgarian land market is affected by 
another problem which is that half of the parcels are co-owned by more than one owner.  
Land “co-ownership” results from a combination of four factors: (a) the way land was 
restituted; (b) the current inheritance law; (c) the fragmented 1946 ownership structure; (d) 
the absence of a land market during communism. During the land restitution process, land 
was normally given back to owners prior to 1946. A large part of these owners are no longer 
alive so that the land was given to their heirs. According to the Bulgarian Inheritance Law, 
every heir gets an equal share of the property when the owner dies. If the pre-1946 land owner 
had died, land was divided among the heirs (sometimes even the second generation). If during 
the land reform process X parcels had to be divided among Y owners, then each owner 
received 1/Y share of each of these X parcels. In this way, an equal treatment of heirs was 
assured.  
A similar inheritance law exists in several Western-European countries, but co-
ownership problems are not observed because land has always been divided among heirs 
                                                 
2 If we look at the household level, we see that 50% of all land owning households is renting out land to a 
cooperative and 29% to a farming company.  Further, 9% of the land owning households are renting out land to 
another household immediately after the owner died. Parcels did not stay fragmented in the hands of the heirs, 
but they were often consolidated through land swaps or rental and sales after the division. In 
Bulgaria, land markets were missing during communism and finding all entitled heirs later 
was difficult, and even if all heirs are identified, reaching an agreement on the division of the 
land is often even more complicated.   
However a similar situation existed in other transition countries where co-ownership is 
not such a problem. The main cause appears to be a Bulgarian law, which sets a legal 
minimum size for a land parcel. To prevent excessive fragmentation of land, a law was 
introduced which states that a plot cannot get a separate ownership title if it is smaller than 0.3 
ha
3.  Vineyards and pastures need to have a minimum size of respectively 0.1 ha and 0.2 ha.  
Hence, a parcel cannot be divided among heirs if the size of the newly created plots falls 
below these levels, a situation referred to with the term “forced” co-ownership. According to 
our survey, more than 40% of the parcels owned by rural households are in co-ownership and 
can not be divided among the owners by law. 
So far, the issue has received very little attention. However, the magnitude of the 
problem seems to have been vastly underestimated. Our survey shows that rural areas of 
Bulgaria are burdened with co-ownership problems.  According to our survey, 51% of all 
parcels owned by rural households are in “co-ownership”. One-fifth of the parcels are owned 
by two persons, another 14% has three co-owners and around 16% of the parcels are owned 
by at least 4 persons.  
The magnitude of the co-ownership problem differs regionally (figure 2.2 and table 
2.4).  In the North-East region, only 11% of the parcels are in co-ownership and the average 
number of owners per parcel is 1.3.  However, in the South-Central and in the North-Central 
region, almost 60% of all parcels are in co-ownership and the average number of owners per 
plot is 2.5 and 2.3 respectively.  The North-East region differs from the other regions since it 
has been part of Romania between the two world wars. Prior to the collectivisation in 1946, 
the area was characterised by larger parcels (of more consolidated land). Moreover, in that 
area, the restitution process ended between 1993 and 1995 which gave owners more time to 
trace all owners and to settle disputes. 
Paradoxically, the official reason for the land legislation which causes co-ownership 
was to prevent inefficient land use by avoiding excessive land ownership fragmentation. 
However, the impact may well have been opposite, i.e. that it has constrained efficient land 
use and market development. Before somebody can rent out or sell the land to somebody else, 
they have to agree with all owners. Obviously, this increases transaction costs in land 
allocation, which is likely to hamper exchange and efficient use of land. 
In the survey, land owners where asked whether they had “effective decision power” on 
land plots. There is clearly regional variation in the share of plots over which the owner has 
effective decision rights. In the North-East, owners have effective decision power on more 
than 70% of the owned parcels, while in the North-Central and South Central, where the 
majority of plots are co-owned, land owners declare to have effective decision power on only 
38% and 54% of the plots they own. Thus in regions where land fragmentation and land co-
ownership are widespread, fewer owners have effective decision power on their plots.  
                                                 
3 This legislation was part of the Law for Agricultural Land Ownership and Use (LALOU) and the Regulation 
for Application of the Law for Agricultural Land Ownership and Use (RALALOU), both introduced in 1991. 
These laws have been changed many times since then (in fact more than 30 times for the LALOU).  Moreover, 
the articles relevant for our discussion on the minimum size have been modified only slightly in 1996, 1997 and 
2002, and none of these changes affected the minimum size.  Co-ownership is likely to increase the transaction costs in land decision-making and 
allocation, and therefore lead to imperfect property rights, which may result in suboptimal 
land allocation, use and exchange (Barzel, 1997).  
Decision-making with co-owners is likely to be more costly than without co-ownership, 
depending on the relationship of the various co-owners and their intensity of interacting.  For 
example, if there are few co-owners and they are close family members living in the same 
village, co-ownership may not have much additional decision-making costs.  However, if 
there are more co-owners and/or if they are living far apart with few interactions, additional 
costs of coordination, supervision and enforcing agreements may be substantial.  The dataset 
includes a variety of relationships between co-owners.   
If decision-making on land use is too costly, relative to the potential benefits of land use 
or land renting out, these additional decision-making costs will make it more likely that the 
“default option” will prevail. This default option may be either not using the land, hence 
leaving land abandoned, or leaving land with the traditional user of the land, which is the 
former collective or state farm, which are now mostly organized as cooperative farms.  Hence, 
if co-ownership significantly increases the transaction costs in (re-) allocating land, then we 
should expect co-owned land plots to be left more abandoned and to be used more by 
cooperatives, ceteris paribus. 
In the rest of the paper we use the survey data to estimate how these property right 
imperfections affect land use and land rental activities. 
 
Empirical Model  
Our model incorporates 4 different allocations of owned land: 1) owner-cultivation; 2) 
renting out to another farming household; 3) renting out to a cooperative (which are mostly 
successor organisation of a former collective farm); 4) renting out to a company; 5) 
abandoning. We apply an empirical model which is based on an unordered choice model 
where the household has to make a single decision among several alternatives. The utility 
derived by household i from land allocation j is  
  ij j i ij Ux β ε ′ = +    (1) 
where  i x is a vector of household and plot characteristics which are the same for all 
allocations.  j β  is a vector of coefficients that determines the utility that a household derives 
from allocation j.  
Which allocation is chosen by a household depends on the utility it derives from a 
certain allocation. Suppose we have J allocation choices, a household will choose allocation j 
if  
     (2)  ( ) for all  jh Prob U U k j >≠
If    is a variable that indicates the allocation choice, and the J disturbances are 





















 for j=0,1,2,…J    (3) Equation (3) describes a multinomial logit model. Since the model given by equation 
(3) is unidentified (i.e. we have more than one solution for  j β  that leads to  ), we have 
to apply a normalization. By assuming that 
i Y = j






































   (4) 
In that case the remaining coefficients  j β for j=1,2,…J will measure the change relative 
to the   group. Hence, the estimated coefficients in a multinomial logit model depend on 
the base category, but the estimated probabilities for 
0 i Y =
i Yj = with j=0,1,2…,J will be the same. 
The choice model estimation incorporates the same 4 allocations of owned land as 
described before.  
We use indicator variables to test the impact of property rights imperfections on the 
land allocation decision, while controlling for a variety of differences in plot, household, and 
regional characteristics which may also affect the land allocation decision. The choice of the 
control variables is based on a model of household land rental decision-making in transition 
countries, developed in Vranken and Swinnen (2003). 
 
Property right imperfections 
The variable NONDIV is a dummy variable that equals one if a plot is in co-ownership 
and cannot be divided among owners due to the legal imposed minimum size. We expect co-
ownership to lead to decision-making problems, which increase the costs of both using the 
land and of changing the land allocation. Since land was initially used by collective and state 
farms, in many cases the default allocation of land for households was to rent the land to 
cooperative farms and farm companies which emerged from the restructuring of the collective 
and state farms or to leave it abandoned when the farm enterprise ended the rental agreement.  
If a plot cannot be divided among co-owners because of legal impediments, decision making 
becomes more costly. Hence, the probability of the default option increases. It becomes more 
likely that the plot owner is either not using the land, hence leaving land abandoned, or 
leaving land with the traditional user of the land, which is the former collective or state farm, 
which are now mostly organized as cooperative farms. 
 The variable NRCOOWN measures the number of co-owners per plot that cannot be 
divided among owners due to the legal imposed minimum size.  We expect that the decision-
problems and inherent transaction costs increase with the number of co-owners.  We would 
therefore expect that the number of co-owners is positively related with land renting to 
collective farms and with abandoning of land.   
Some of the co-owners live in the village, while others live outside the village, 
sometimes far away. The co-ordination problems are likely to be larger when co-owners live 
outside the village because interaction is, on average, more complicated and less frequent, and 
monitoring by co-owners is more costly.  Therefore we would expect the impact of the 
previous effects to be stronger when co-owners do not live in the village, compared to when 
they do.  To estimate whether the location of the co-owners matters, we distinguish for the plots which can not be divided by law between the number of co-owners living in the village 




The variable QUALITY is an indicator of land quality based on the Bulgarian land 
classification system and assigns to each plot a score between 1 and 10. A high quality parcel 
gets value one, a low quality parcel gets value ten.  A high quality land plot is more likely to 
be used by either a household farm or a farm enterprise, and we expect it to be negatively 
correlated with abandonment.  
The cost of using a parcel of land increases with the distance of the plot.  The variable 
DISTANCE measures the distance in kilometres of the plot to the house of the owner, and we 
expect a negative impact on owner-cultivation.   
We include the variable PLOTSIZE which equals the size of the plot. We expect that 
larger plots are more suitable for cultivation and expect that this variable is negatively 
correlated with the probability of not using the land. Further, large farming enterprises are 
often relying on more mechanized production techniques so that they are particularly keen in 
cultivated larger plots. 
 
Household and Regional Characteristics 
The variable LANDOWNED gives the total amount of land owned by a household. The 
effect of this variable is ambiguous ex ante. In the presence of credit market imperfections, 
owned land, as collateral, can affect access to credit for households.  In such circumstances, 
we expect that the variable LANDOWNED will have a positive impact on the probability of 
owner-cultivation. On the other hand, a household with more land, ceteris paribus, is more 
likely is to rent out land.  
We include two sets of indicators of managerial capacity of the household: age 
(AGEHH) and education (EDUHH) of the household head. Other studies (e.g. Rizov et al., 
2001) typically show a non-linear effect of these variables. Therefore, we also include the 
square terms, AGEHH2 and EDUHH2.  The impact of both variables is not obvious ex ante.  
Concerning age, the older a household head, the more experience he has to farm, but younger 
persons may be less risk averse and therefore more likely to use the land themselves.  More 
educated household heads may be better managers, but are also likely to have more off-farm 
opportunities.    
Finally, we control for regional differences by including the variable NORTH-EAST 
and SOUTH-EAST, two dummy variables who equal one if the plot is located respectively in 
Dobrich and Varna, or in Veliko Tarnovo. The default region is the south-central region 
which holds Plovdiv and Stara Zagora. 
 
Results 
The multinomial regression results with owner-cultivation as base category are given in 
table 5. Table 6 gives the regression results with renting out to farming enterprises as base 
category. Since our prime interest in this paper is the impact of property rights imperfections, 
we focus mostly on these findings.   First, the estimation results show that property right imperfections under the form of 
co-ownership have a strong impact on the allocation of land in Bulgaria.  Land is more likely 
to be rented out to a cooperative if the parcel is in co-ownership and undividable by law, i.e. if 
the parcel is in “forced” co-ownership.  In that case, owner-cultivation, renting out to a 
farming company and land abandonment become less likely.  
Second, the multinomial logit regression indicate that the probability to rent out land to 
a cooperative or leaving land abandoned relative to owner-cultivation increases with the 
number of owners.  An increase in the number of coowners decreases the likelihood of owner-
cultivation, renting out to a company or households, and abandonment relative to relative to 
renting out to a cooperative. The strong positive impact of “forced” co-ownership on renting 
out to a cooperative and negative impact on owner-cultivation indicates that the law 
concerning the minimum plot size strongly favours large scale farming organisations at the 
disadvantage of individual farmers.  
Third, our estimations further show that the impact of the number of co-owners does 
depend on whether they are living in or outside the village. The probability to leave the plot 
abandoned relative to owner-cultivation increases with the number of co-owners that are 
living outside the village, but the number of co-owners living inside the village does not affect 
the probability of abandonment. Clearly, co-ordination problems are higher when co-owners 
are living farther away. 
Other plot characteristics have also important effects on the allocation decision: land 
quality, and distance all have a significant impact on the likelihood of abandoning the plot, 
and the impacts are as hypothesized.  As expected, increased distance of the plot to the house 
decreases the likelihood of owner-cultivation and increases the likelihood of land 
abandonment. 
  Characteristics of the household also have an impact. There is a significant impact of 
the variable AGEHH. The probability that a land owner leaves its plot abandoned first 
decreases with age. However, at the pension entitled age, the relation reverses and the 
likelihood of land abandonment increases.  
 
Welfare implications 
An important question related to imperfect property rights relates to the impact on 
household welfare. Therefore, we calculated for each household a welfare index based on the 
ownership of certain assets/items as a small, medium or large house, TV, car, telephone, etc. 
We aggregated these various indicators using principal component analysis (Finan et al., 
2003). We run an ordinary least square regression with the welfare index as dependent 
variables and land endowment and human capital characteristics as regressors. Plot level 
characteristics are excluded because welfare is analysed at household level. We distinguish 
between the amount of land owned solely by the household (OWNSOLE) and the amount of 
land owned but in co-ownership (COOWN). We include the variable DCULT, a dummy that 
equals one if the household is cultivating land. If this variable has a positive impact on 
housheold’s welfare, policies to improve household’s access to land for cultivation are 
desirable.  
As human capital variables we include age and education level of the household head 
(AGEHH and EDUHH). Further we include current households size (HHSIZE) as this also 
influences the amount of money disposable to acquire certain assets or items. Finally we take 
regional fixed effects into account by including regional dummy variables.   We can assume that, in Bulgaria, the amount of land owned is not affected by the 
welfare level because rural households could hardly influence the amount of land they 
received through the restitution process and, since the start of transition, hardly any 
agricultural land has been bought or sold according to our survey data. Hence, it is reasonable 
to assume that the amount of land owned affects the household’s welfare as it is a mean to 
generate income. However, due to the absence of land sales, we can not assume that land 
ownership is an expression of a household’s wealth. 
Our results confirm that the amount of land owned solely by one household increases 
welfare significantly (table 7). The amount of land in co-ownership has hardly any impact. If 
we look at the elasticity of welfare for land, we see that, at the mean of the independent 
variables, an increase of 1 hectare in the amount of land owned solely by one household 
increases their welfare with 91%. An increase of 1 hectare in the amount of land in co-
ownership increases welfare with only 38%. Our results indicate that co-ownership of land is 
not only discouraging owner-cultivation, but it also mitigates the positive impact of land 
ownership on welfare. 
Further, our results indicate that households who are cultivating at least one parcel of 
land are wealthier. Stimulating access to land for rural households would clearly be beneficial. 
 
Conclusion 
This study used a unique 2003 survey dataset to analyse the developments in land use 
and exchange in Bulgaria.  The survey and analysis yields several results. 
Land is highly fragmented in Bulgaria.  Rural households own on average 6 plots of 
land. Such a highly fragmented ownership structure increases the need for an efficient 
exchange of land between owners and users of land.   
However, the land sales market is not well developed. Land sales are very rare. As in 
many other transition countries, a variety of factors have constrained the development of the 
land sales market. 
In contrast, land rental agreements are very widespread.  Land rental is widely used to 
exchange land between owners and users of the land.  The users include a variety of farm 
types, including cooperatives, farming companies, and individual farms. 
While land titles are distributed and land plots clearly defined and delineated, an 
important property rights problem that affects land allocation exists under the form of so-
called “co-ownership”.  Due to a combination of historical factors, many plots have more than 
one owner and in some cases many more. By law certain plots are undividable among heirs 
because the plot size after division would fall under the imposed minimum plot size. Co-
ownership on agricultural land is widespread in Bulgaria: half of the plots in our sample are 
owned by more than one person. 
Our estimation results show that co-ownership has a major, impact on land use and 
allocation.  It affects both use and exchange of land. Land under co-ownership and which is 
undividable by law, is more likely to be left abandoned or to be used by large enterprises – the 
default users of lands given the history of land use in Bulgaria – compared to owner-
cultivation or renting out to an other household. 
Paradoxically, these effects result from a legislation which was intended to prevent 
fragmentation of land and inefficient land use.   The legislation is a prime cause of the co-
ownership situation and strongly affects efficient land use and allocation. Our analysis shows that solving co-ownership problems would not only stimulate 
efficient land allocation, but it would also increase the possibility to use land as a means of 
generating income and hence to improve welfare. Land owned solely by one household has a 
significantly positive influence on the household’s welfare. However, land in co-ownership 
contributes hardly anything to the welfare of the household.   
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Source: Own calculations  
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Source: Own calculations  
  
Table 1 Pre-reform agricultural structures in Bulgaria, 1985 
  Share of arable land (%)  Average size (ha) 
AICs comprising 
of 
80.7 12 600 
TKZS 58.3 4  000 
SAFs 8.8 2  100 
MTS 0 0 
Brigades 13.6 na 
Other agricultural 
organisations 
6.2 1 215 
Private plots  13.1 0.38 




Table 2 Post-reform agricultural structures in Bulgaria, 1995-1999 
 1995  1999 












State farms  6.5 310.9 1.6 241.2 




Co-operatives 40.8 815.3 36.8 482.5 
Individual farms  52.5 1.4 56.0 2.6* 
Farming companies  0.7 283.5 3.6 378.6 
Total 100.0 100.0  
Source: NSI 
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Table 3 Destination/origin of the land owned/cultivated by Bulgarian rural households, 2003  
Land cultivating by rural households 






Used by owner  90.36 29.94 91.43 78.2 
Rented in from other household  6.6 7.91 6.42 6.8 
Rented in from institution  0.51 62.15 0.64 13.6 
Rented in from enterprise  2.54   1.5 1.4 






Used by owner  93.3 30.9 97.0 76.2 
Rented in from other household  8.9 4.5 7.9 7.1 
Rented in from institution  1.1 82.7 1.8 26.0 
Rented in from enterprise  5.6 0.0 1.8 2.2 
Land owning rural households 






Used by the owner  15.0 11.8 21.6 18.2 
Rented out to an other household  2.7 7.4 0.8 2.2 
Rented out to a cooperative  29.0 52.1 43.7 39.9 
Rented out to company  29.0 27.4 5.8 16.1 
Abandoned 24.3 1.3 28.2 23.6 






Used by the owner  47.5 18.4 60.8 44.5 
Rented out to an other household  13.6 10.3 4.9 9.0 
Rented out to a cooperative  24.3 55.7 60.1 48.6 
Rented out to company  50.3 36.8 8.7 28.8 
Abandoned 67.2 2.7 56.7 43.7 
Source: Own calculations   
Table 4 Regional variation in land use and ownership of Bulgarian households in 2003 









Land owning rural households            
Area owned per household  ha  3.7  4.6  3.5  **  3.9 
Area used by owner    0.3  0.5  1.0    0.6 
Number of plots owned per household    6.7  2.4  7.5  ***  5.8 
Average plot size  ha  0.5  1.9  0.5  ***  0.7 
Share of co-owned parcels  %  59.3  11.1  55.9  ***  51.4 
Average number of owners per plot    2.3  1.3  2.4  ***  2.2 
Share of plots over which the owner declares to have effective decision 
power %  72.4 38.0  ***        
           
          
           
          
53.9 51.0
 
Land cultivating households 
Share of households that cultivate land  %  50.0  56.4  61.8  *  56.9 
Area cultivated per household  ha  0.7  1.6  1.7    1.5 
 
Rural households 
Age household head  years  67.5  63.1  66.5  ***  65.8 
Education household head  years  9.1  8.2  9.3  ***  8.9 
*, ***, *** indicates that the null hypothesis of equality of means among regions is rejected at a 10%, 5%, 1% significance level 
Source: Own calculations  
 Table 5: Multinomial regression result with owner-cultivation as base category 


















NONDIV                0.224 0.726 -0.139  0.086  
           (0.485)  (0.000) 





NRCOOWNER                        0.023 0.338 0.073 0.128
              (0.848)  (0.000) 





NRCOOWNEROUT               -0.021  0.303 0.020 0.173
           . 9 0 2 ( 0 )   (0.000) 





NRCOOWNERIN                0.093 0.419 0.153 0.007
           . 6 4 4 ( 0 )   (0.000) 





QUALITY                          0.138 0.092 -0.457 0.451 0.139 0.089 -0.470 0.446 0.140 0.091 -0.468 0.445
 (0.116)  (0.005) 





















DISTANCE                          0.349 0.345 0.317 0.368 0.340 0.334 0.308 0.358 0.339 0.334 0.308 0.357
 (0.000)  (0.000) 





















PLOTSIZE                          -0.002 -0.002 -0.000 -0.086 -0.004 -0.002 0.001 -0.078 -0.003 -0.002 0.001 -0.080
 (0.849)  (0.500) 
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Table 5: Multinomial regression result with owner-cultivation as base category (continued) 


















LANDOWNED                          -0.008 0.003 0.003 0.003 -0.007 0.003 0.002 0.003 -0.007 0.002 0.002 0.003
 (0.079)  (0.004) 





















AGEHH                          -0.010 -0.017 0.069 -0.208 -0.001 0.030 0.085 -0.196 0.005 0.033 0.091 -0.207
 (0.911)  (0.690) 





















AGEHH2                          0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.002 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.002 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.002
 (0.732)  (0.334) 





















EDUHH                          -0.268 0.125 0.075 -0.014 -0.254 0.141 0.097 -0.005 -0.261 0.133 0.089 0.006
 (0.110)  (0.154) 





















EDUHH2                          0.017 -0.009 0.001 0.003 0.016 -0.010 0.000 0.002 0.016 -0.010 0.001 0.002
 (0.055)  (0.035) 





















NORTH-EAST                          1.463 0.872 0.148 -2.226 1.416 0.915 0.237 -2.238 1.430 0.956 0.254 -2.267
 (0.000)  (0.000) 





















SOUTH-CENTRAL                          -1.974 -0.032 -1.398 -1.135 -1.973 -0.041 -1.392 -1.132 -1.955 0.004 -1.370 -1.200
 (0.000)  (0.800) 





















Constant                          -2.239 -1.577 -2.647 2.746 -2.475 -3.170 -3.357 2.212 -2.627 -3.278 -3.521 2.590
 (0.457)  (0.249) 





















Source: Own calculations  
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NONDIV           -0.726  -0.501  -0.864  -0.640 
           (0.000)  (0.110) 





NRCOOWNER                         -0.338 -0.315 -0.265 -0.210
            (0.000)  (0.008) 





NRCOOWNEROUT             -0.303  -0.324  -0.283  -0.130
           . 0 0 0 ( 0 )   (0.049) 





NRCOOWNERIN             -0.419  -0.326  -0.266  -0.412
           . 0 0 0 ( 0 )   (0.087) 





QUALITY                          -0.092 0.046 -0.549 0.358 -0.089 0.050 -0.559 0.357 -0.091 0.049 -0.559 0.354
 (0.005)  (0.593) 





















DISTANCE                          -0.345 0.004 -0.028 0.023 -0.334 0.006 -0.025 0.024 -0.334 0.005 -0.026 0.023
 (0.000)  (0.616) 





















PLOTSIZE                          0.002 -0.000 0.002 -0.084 0.002 -0.002 0.003 -0.076 0.002 -0.002 0.003 -0.078
 (0.500)  (0.986) 
















































LANDOWNED                          -0.003 -0.011 -0.000 0.000 -0.003 -0.010 -0.000 -0.000 -0.002 -0.010 -0.000 0.000
 (0.004)  (0.011) 





















AGEHH                          0.017 0.006 0.085 -0.191 -0.030 -0.031 0.055 -0.226 -0.033 -0.028 0.058 -0.240
 (0.690)  (0.942) 





















AGEHH2                          -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.002
 (0.334)  (0.922) 





















EDUHH                    -0.125  -0.393  -0.049  -0.139 -0.141 -0.395 -0.044 -0.146 -0.133 -0.394 -0.044 -0.127
 (0.154)  (0.013) 





















EDUHH2                          0.009 0.026 0.010 0.012 0.010 0.026 0.010 0.012 0.010 0.026 0.010 0.011
 (0.035)  (0.002) 





















NORTH-EAST                          -0.872 0.590 -0.724 -3.098 -0.915 0.501 -0.678 -3.153 -0.956 0.474 -0.702 -3.223
 (0.000)  (0.092) 





















SOUTH-CENTRAL  0.032                        -1.942 -1.366 -1.102 0.041 -1.932 -1.351 -1.091 -0.004 -1.959 -1.374 -1.203
 (0.800)  (0.000) 





















Constant                          1.577 -0.662 -1.070 4.324 3.170 0.695 -0.188 5.381 3.278 0.651 -0.243 5.868
 (0.249)  (0.819) 























 Table 7 OLS regression with welfare index as dependent variable 





ONWSOLE 0.12  6.650***  91.2 2.0  ha 
COOWN 0.05  1.650  38.2 0.6  ha 
        
AGEHH -0.034  -6.810***  -25.6 65.4  years 
EDUHH 0.078  4.260***  59.5 8.9  years 
HHSIZE 0.019  1.000 14.1 2.2  members 
DCULT 0.201  1.860*  153.2    
Intercept 1.950  4.610***    
a Percent change in welfare due to a one unit increase in the independent variable at its 
mean value. For the dummy variable DCULT, the welfare change gives the percent 
change in welfare due to a discrete change of the dummy variable from 0 to 1. 
Source: Own calculations  
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